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China's Changing of the Guard

AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE

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After the Tiananmen crisis in June, 1989, many observers thought that the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would collapse. Instead, the regime brought inflation under control, restarted economic growth, expanded foreign trade, and increased its absorption of foreign direct investment. It restored normal relations with the G-7 countries that had imposed sanctions, resumed the exchange of summits with the United States, presided over the retrocession of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, and won the right to hold the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. It arrested or exiled political dissidents, crushed the fledgling China Democratic Party, and seems to have largely suppressed the Falun Gong spiritual movement.

Many China specialists and democracy theorists—myself among them—expected the regime to fall to democratization's “third wave.”¹ Instead, the regime has reconsolidated itself.² Regime theory holds that authoritarian systems are inherently fragile because of weak legitimacy, overreliance on coercion, overcentralization of decision making, and the predominance of personal power over institutional norms. This particular authoritarian system, however, has proven resilient.

The causes of its resilience are complex. But many of them can be summed up in the concept of institutionalization—understood either in the currently fashionable sense of behavior that is constrained by formal and informal rules, or in the older sense summarized by Samuel P. Huntington as consisting of the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of state organizations.³ This article focuses on four aspects of the CCP regime's institutionalization: 1) the increasingly norm-bound nature of its succession politics; 2) the increase in meritocratic as opposed

to factional considerations in the promotion of political elites; 3) the differentiation and functional specialization of institutions within the regime; and 4) the establishment of institutions for political participation and appeal that strengthen the CCP's legitimacy among the public at large. While these developments do not guarantee that the regime will be able to solve all the challenges that it faces, they do caution against too-hasty arguments that it cannot adapt and survive.

Norm-Bound Succession Politics

As this article is published, the Chinese regime is in the middle of a historic demonstration of institutional stability: its peaceful, orderly transition from the so-called third generation of leadership, headed by Jiang Zemin, to the fourth, headed by Hu Jintao. Few authoritarian regimes—be they communist, fascist, corporatist, or personalist—have managed to conduct orderly, peaceful, timely, and stable successions. Instead, the moment of transfer has almost always been a moment of crisis—breaking out ahead of or behind the nominal schedule, involving purges or arrests, factionalism, sometimes violence, and opening the door to the chaotic intrusion into the political process of the masses or the military. China's current succession displays attributes of institutionalization unusual in the history of authoritarianism and unprecedented in the history of the PRC. It is the most orderly, peaceful, deliberate, and rule-bound succession in the history of modern China outside of the recent institutionalization of electoral democracy in Taiwan.⁴

Hu Jintao, the new general secretary of the CCP as of the Sixteenth Party Congress in November 2002, has held the position of successor-apparent for ten years. Four of the other eight top-ranking appointments (Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Zeng Qinghong, and Luo Gan) had been decided a year or two in advance. The remaining four members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) were simply elevated from the outgoing Politburo. Barring a major crisis, the transition will continue to an orderly conclusion in March 2003, leading to the election of Hu Jintao as state president and chairman of the Central Military Commission, Wu Bangguo as chair of the National People's Congress (NPC), and Wen Jiabao as premier. Outgoing officials President Jiang Zemin, NPC Chair Li Peng, and Premier Zhu Rongji will leave their state offices, having already left their Party offices in the fall, and will cease to have any direct role in politics.

It takes some historical perspective to appreciate this outcome for the achievement that it is. During the Mao years, Party congresses and National People's Congresses seldom met, and when they did it was rarely on schedule. There have never before been effective terms of office or age limits for persons holding the rank of "central leader"; Mao and Deng each exercised supreme authority until the end of his life. Nor has there ever been an orderly assumption of office by a designated successor:

Mao purged Liu Shaoqi, the president of the PRC, by having Red Guards seize him and put him in prison, where he died. Mao's officially designated successor, Lin Biao, allegedly tried to seize power from Mao, was discovered, and died in a plane crash while fleeing. Mao appointed Hua Guofeng as his successor simply by stating that Hua was his choice. Hua was removed from office at Deng Xiaoping's behest before Hua's term of office was over. Deng removed from power both of his own chosen successors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. Deng and the other elders overrode the Politburo in 1989 to impose Jiang Zemin as successor to the Party leadership.

Measured against these historical precedents, the current succession displays many firsts, all indicative of institutionalization:

- Jiang Zemin survived his full allotted time in office. He was installed as general secretary in 1989, and was reelected in 1992 and 1997, serving two-and-a-half terms (he assumed the Central Military Commission chairmanship in 1989 and the state presidency in 1992). His patron, Deng, did not remove him from office (although Deng considered doing so in 1992). Although Jiang was called to the top post in Beijing over the heads of Li Peng and Li Ruihuan, and had at times adversarial relations with both of them, neither tried to replace him. In consolidating his authority, Jiang engineered the fall from power of Yang Shangkun in 1992 and Qiao Shi in 1997, but neither of these men tried to unseat him.

- Jiang did not stay in office past the time when, according to the rules, he should have left office. In 1997, the Politburo established by consensus a new, informal rule that senior leaders should not be reappointed to another term after they reach the age of 70. When this rule was established, Jiang was 71, but he had himself declared a one-time exception to it, promising to retire in 2002. This promise, along with the fact that he would be 76 in 2002, were the main reasons why no serious consideration was given to his remaining in office, even though there was much speculation in the international press that he was trying to stay. The age-70 rule will also make it necessary for Jiang to retire from the post of Central Military Commission chairman, a post for which there have never been either term or age limits, and to which the 1997 decision did not explicitly apply. Jiang's third post, the state presidency, is limited by the Constitution to two terms, which he has already served.

- Jiang Zemin was the first leader in the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC) not to select his own successor. Mao chose several successors for himself (Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and Hua Guofeng). So did Deng (Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang Zemin). By contrast, Deng Xiaoping made Hu Jintao the PBSC's youngest member in 1992, and for the entire ten years of Hu's incumbency as informal successor-designate, Jiang Zemin did not challenge Hu's position. The incoming premier, Wen Jiabao, was recommended by Zhu Rongji over Jiang's choices, Wu Bangguo and Li Changchun.

- The retired elders (consisting after 1997 of Wan Li, Qiao Shi, Song Ping, Liu Huaqing, and several others) did not attempt to intervene in the succession or, indeed, in any decision. The right of three earlier elders (Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian) to intervene had been established by a secret Politburo resolution in 1987 and was reinforced by Deng's chairmanship of the Central Military Commission. This right was exercised to decisive effect during the 1989 Tiananmen crisis.⁵ In 1997, Deng Xiaoping, the last of the three elders, died. A new group of elders was created by the retirements of Qiao Shi and others from the PBSC. The 1987 Politburo resolution was not renewed for them, nor did any of them sit on the CMC. These new elders received intra-Party documents and occasionally expressed their views,⁶ but they did not attend Politburo meetings or exercise any decision-making power.

- The military exercised no influence over the succession. Although some senior military officers spoke in favor of Jiang's staying on in the position of CMC chair, they were ignored. They expressed no views on any other issue relating to the transfer of power. The succession of uniformed officers within the CMC echoes that in the civilian hierarchy: Senior officers associated with Jiang Zemin and over the age of 70—Fu Quanyou and Yu Yongbo—have retired, to be replaced by a younger generation of officers. Following a tradition set in place in 1997, no uniformed officer was elected to the PBSC; the military representatives in Party Center were seated in the Politburo.

- The selection of the new Politburo was made by consensus within the old Politburo. The process was, to be sure, dominated by the senior members, and each of them tried and succeeded in placing associates in the successor body. But these factional considerations were played out within limits imposed by the need for a leadership consensus. None of the top leaders—Jiang, Li Peng, or Zhu Rongji—was powerful enough to force a nominee on his colleagues against their wills.

Never before in PRC history has there been a succession whose arrangements were fixed this far in advance, remained so stable to the end, and whose results so unambiguously transferred power from one generation of leaders to another. It is not that factions no longer exist, but that their powers are now in a state of mutual balance and that they have all learned a thing or two from the PRC's history. Political factions today have neither the power nor, perhaps more importantly, the will to upset rules that have been painfully arrived at. The absence of anyone with supreme power to upset these rules helps make them self-reinforcing.

Meritocracy Modifies Factionalism

Factional considerations played a role in the succession process. But they were constrained by a twenty-year process of meritocratic winnowing that limited the list of candidates who could be considered in the final

jockeying for position. Certainly, except for the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), there have always been both meritocratic and factional elements in promotions within the Chinese party-state. But until

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now, even at the most meritocratic times, the major criteria for promotion at the top were the ability to shift with changing political lines and personal loyalty to the top leader—first Mao Zedong, then Deng Xiaoping. While those among the new leading group are ideologically alert and politically savvy, and have mostly allied themselves with one senior leader or another, they rose to the top predominantly because of administrative skill, technical knowledge, educational background, and Party, rather than personal loyalty.

The start of this process was Deng Xiaoping's 1980 instruction to senior Party leaders to undertake a "four-way transformation" (*sihua*) of the cadre corps by finding and promoting cadres around the age of 40 who were "revolutionary, younger, more educated, and more technically specialized" (*geminghua, nianqinghua, zhishihua, zhuanyehua*). In this way, Hu Jintao was promoted several levels by the CCP first secretary of Gansu Province, where he was then working; Wu Bangguo was promoted to party secretary of Shanghai's science and technology commission; and Wen Jiabao became deputy head of the provincial geology bureau in Gansu. The story was more or less the same for each member of the new Politburo.

In 1983, the CCP's Organization Department created a list of the most promising cadres of the "four transformations" generation, which it turned to whenever it needed to recommend a younger cadre for a post carrying ministerial rank. Hu Jintao was selected from this list to become Party secretary of Guizhou, Wen Jiabao to become deputy head of the powerful Central Party Office, and so on. The same cadre-rejuvenation policy led Deng to order that someone younger than 50 be appointed to the Fourteenth Politburo Standing Committee in 1992. That choice fell upon Hu Jintao, so that his current accession to the position of General Secretary marks the orderly working out of the same process set in motion twenty years earlier.

Five of the nine members of today's new PBSC were members or alternate members of the Central Committee in 1982. This indicates the deliberateness and regularity of the succession process. The need to select PBSC members from the relatively small pool of candidates who survived the twenty-year selection process constrained the way in which factionalism worked between 2000 and 2002. Jiang Zemin could make

the case for Zeng Qinghong or Zeng Peiyan, Li Peng for Luo Gan, and Zhu Rongji for Wen Jiabao, only on the basis of each person's excellent performance over the course of two decades in technically and administratively challenging jobs, and not because of symbolic importance (for example, Mao's promotion of Chen Yonggui) or ideological correctness (Mao's promotion of the so-called Gang of Four).

A norm of staff neutrality has become to some degree accepted at high levels within the Party Center, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission, so that the careers of rising stars have been relatively unperturbed by factional turmoil at the top. When Zhao Ziyang was purged in 1989, a few of his associates were immediately purged, but most of them were gradually moved into secondary bureaucratic posts over the course of the next couple of years. Some even continued to advance in their careers. Wen Jiabao, for example, served eight consecutive years as director of the powerful Party Central Office under three different general secretaries (Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang Zemin). In contrast to the old spoils-like practices in which a leader's purge led quickly to the rooting-out of his followers several levels down the political system, the new system limits the damage that factional strife does to the orderly careers of the rising generation of leaders.

The product of this less factionalized, more regularized process is a competent leadership group that has high morale; that is politically balanced in representing different factions in the Party; that lacks one or two dominant figures, and is thus structurally constrained to make decisions collectively; and that is probably as collegial as any political leadership can be, because all the members came to the top through the same process, which they all view as having been broadly fair.⁷

Whether this event sets the template for future successions remains uncertain, but the chances of that happening are increased insofar as the current succession entrenches—as it does—rules that have elite support (for example, the age-70 rule), historical depth (the rules governing the meritocratic promotion system), and structural reinforcement from the informal political structure of balanced factional power.

Institutional Differentiation within the Regime

At the high point of political reform in 1987, Zhao Ziyang proposed the "separation of Party and government" and the "separation of Party and enterprise." With Zhao's fall from power in 1989, these ideas were abandoned. Yet in the intervening 14 years, much of what he proposed has happened by evolution, as the separation of responsibilities and spheres of authority—which Max Weber saw as definitive characteristics of the modern state—has gradually increased. What belongs to a given agency to handle is usually handled by that agency not only without interference, but with a growing sense that interference would be illegitimate.

One group of specialists, located in the Party Center, manages ideology, mobilization, and propaganda (in the outgoing regime, it included people like Jiang Zemin, Li Ruihuan, Hu Jintao, and Zeng Qinghong). Another group, located in the State Council, makes economic policy (including Premier Zhu Rongji, vice-premiers Wen Jiabao and Wu Bangguo, most State Council members, and most provincial governors and Party secretaries). Provincial-level governors and Party secretaries have an increasingly wide scope to set local policy in such areas as education, health, welfare, the environment, foreign investment, and economic development. Many large state enterprises have now been removed from state ownership or placed under joint state-private ownership. Enterprise-management decisions are made on predominantly economic rather than political bases. State Council members, provincial-level officials, and enterprise managers are selected increasingly for their policy-relevant expertise. And economic policy makers at all levels suffer less and less frequently from intervention by the ideology-and-mobilization specialists.

The NPC has become progressively more autonomous, initiating legislation and actively reviewing and altering the proposals for legislation presented to it.⁸ The police and courts remain highly politicized, but in the case of the courts, at least, a norm of judicial independence has been declared (in the 1994 Judges' Law and elsewhere) and judges are applying it more often in economic and criminal cases that are not sensitive enough to draw interference from Party authorities.

The military is still a "Party army," but it has also become smaller, more technically competent, and more professional. The officers being promoted to the CMC in the current succession are, as a group, distinguished more for their professional accomplishments and less for their political loyalties than was the case with previous CMC cohorts.⁹ Calls have come, apparently from the younger members of the officer corps, to make the army a nonpartisan national force without the obligation to defend a particular ruling party. And although the incoming leader, Hu Jintao, has rejected these calls, the fact that they were voiced at all is a sign of a growing professional ethos within military ranks.¹⁰

All Chinese media are owned (at least formally, and for the most part actually) by Party and state agencies. But the media have become more commercialized and therefore less politicized. A handful of important outlets remain under variously direct control by the Party's propaganda department—for instance, *People's Daily*, the New China News Agency, China Central Television, provincial-level Party newspapers, the army newspaper, and so on. But to some extent, these media—and even more so, other newspapers, magazines, and radio or television stations around the country—fight for market share by covering movie and pop stars, sports, and scandals. In the political domain, they often push the envelope of what the regime considers off-limits by investigating stories about local corruption and abuses of power.

To be sure, the Chinese regime is still a party-state, in which the Party penetrates all other institutions and makes policy for all realms of action. And it is still a centralized, unitary system in which power at lower levels derives from grants by the center. But neither the top leader nor the central Party organs interfere as much in the work of other agencies as was the case under Mao and (less so) Deng. Ideological considerations have only marginal, if any, influence on most policy decisions. And staff members are promoted increasingly on the basis of their professional expertise in a relevant area.

All of this is partly to say, as has often been said before, that the regime is pragmatic. But behind the attitude of pragmatism lie increased institutional complexity, autonomy, and coherence—attributes that according to Huntington's theory should equip the regime to adapt more successfully to the challenges it faces.

Input Institutions and Political Legitimacy

One of the puzzles of the post-Tiananmen period has been the regime's apparent ability to rehabilitate its legitimacy (defined as the public's belief that the regime is lawful and should be obeyed) from the low point of 1989, when vast, nationwide prodemocracy demonstrations revealed the disaffection of a large segment of the urban population.

General theories of authoritarian regimes, along with empirical impressions of the current situation in China, might lead one to expect that the regime would now be decidedly low on legitimacy: Although authoritarian regimes often enjoy high legitimacy when they come to power, that legitimacy usually deteriorates for want of democratic procedures to cultivate ongoing consent. In the case of contemporary China, the regime's ideology is bankrupt. The transition from a socialist to a quasi-market economy has created a great deal of social unrest. And the regime relies heavily on coercion to repress political and religious dissent.

Direct evidence about attitudes, however, shows the contrary. In a 1993 nationwide random-sample survey conducted by Tianjian Shi, 94.1 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that, "We should trust and obey the government, for in the last analysis it serves our interests." A 2002 survey by Shi found high percentages of respondents who answered similarly regarding both the central and local governments.¹¹ There is much other evidence from both quantitative and qualitative studies to suggest that expressions of dissatisfaction, including widely reported worker and peasant demonstrations, are usually directed at lower-level authorities, while the regime as a whole continues to enjoy high levels of acceptance.

A number of explanations can be offered for this pattern. Among them:

- Most people's living standards have risen during two decades of economic growth.

- The Party has coopted elites by offering Party membership to able persons from all walks of life and by granting the informal protection of property rights to private entrepreneurs. This new direction in Party policy has been given ideological grounding in Jiang Zemin's theory of the "Three Represents," which says that the Party should represent advanced productive forces, advanced culture, and the basic interests of all the Chinese working people—that is, that it should stand for the middle classes as much as or more than the workers and peasants.

- The Chinese display relatively high interpersonal trust, an attitude that precedes and fosters regime legitimacy.¹²

- The Chinese population favors stability and fears political disorder. By pointing to the example of postcommunist chaos in Russia, the CCP has persuaded most Chinese, including intellectuals—from whom criticism might be particularly expected—that political reform is dangerous to their welfare.

- Thanks to the success of political repression, there is no organized alternative to the regime.

- Coercive repression—in 1989 and after—may itself have generated legitimacy by persuading the public that the regime's grip on power is unshakeable. Effective repression may generate only resigned obedience at first, but to maintain cognitive consonance, citizens who have no choice but to obey a regime may come to evaluate its performance and responsiveness (themselves components of legitimacy) relatively highly.¹³ In seeking psychological coherence, citizens may convince themselves that their acceptance of the regime is voluntary—precisely because of, not despite, the fact that they have no alternative.

All these explanations may have value. Here, though, I would like to develop another explanation, more directly related to this essay's theme of institutionalization: The regime has developed a series of input institutions (that is, institutions that people can use to apprise the state of their concerns) that allow Chinese to believe that they have some influence on policy decisions and personnel choices at the local level.

The most thorough account of these institutions is Tianjian Shi's *Political Participation in Beijing*, which, although researched before 1989, describes institutions that are still in place. According to Shi, Chinese participate at the local and work-unit levels in a variety of ways. These include voting, assisting candidates in local-level elections, and lobbying unit leaders. Participation is frequent, and activism is correlated with a sense of political efficacy (defined as an individual's belief that he or she is capable of having some effect on the political system). Shi's argument is supported by the work of Melanie Manion, who has shown that in localities with competitive village elections, leaders' policy positions are closer to those of their constituents than in villages with noncompetitive voting.¹⁴

In addition to the institutions discussed by Shi and Manion, there are

at least four other sets of input institutions that may help to create regime legitimacy at the mass level:

- The Administrative Litigation Act of 1989 allows citizens to sue government agencies for alleged violations of government policy. According to Minxin Pei, the number of suits stood in 1999 at 98,600. The success rate (determined by court victories plus favorable settlements) has ranged from 27 percent to around 40 percent. In at least one province, government financial support is now offered through a legal aid program to enable poor citizens to take advantage of the program.¹⁵

- Party and government agencies maintain offices for citizen complaints—letters-and-visits departments (*xinfangju*)—which can be delivered in person or by letter. Little research has been done on this process, but the offices are common and their ability to deal with individual citizen complaints may be considerable.

- As people's congresses at all levels have grown more independent—along with people's political consultative conferences, United Front structures that meet at each level just prior to the meeting of the people's congress—they have become an increasingly important channel by which citizen complaints may be aired through representatives.

- As the mass media have become more independent and market-driven, so too have they increasingly positioned themselves as tribunes of the people, exposing complaints against wrong-doing by local-level officials.

These channels of demand- and complaint-making have two common features. One is that they encourage individual rather than group-based inputs, the latter of which are viewed as threatening by the regime. The other is that they focus complaints against specific local-level agencies or officials, diffusing possible aggression against the Chinese party-state generally. Accordingly, they enable citizens to pursue grievances without creating the potential to threaten the regime as a whole.

An Authoritarian Transition?

Despite the institutionalization of orderly succession processes, meritocratic promotions, bureaucratic differentiation, and channels of mass participation and appeal, the regime still faces massive challenges to its survival. This essay does not attempt to predict whether the regime will surmount them. What we can say on available evidence is that the regime is not supine, weak, or bereft of policy options. In contrast with the Soviet and Eastern European ruling groups in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the new Chinese leaders do not feel that they are at the end of history. The policy-statement excerpts contained in their investigation reports show that these leaders think they can solve China's problems.¹⁶ They intend to fight corruption; reform the state-owned enterprises; ameliorate the lot of the peasants; improve the environment;

comply with World Trade Organization rules while using transitional privileges to ease China's entry into full compliance; suppress political opposition; meet the challenge of U.S. containment; and, above all, stay in power and direct China's modernization. The argument that democratization, freedom, and human rights would lead to a truer kind of stability—as convincing as it may be to the democrats of the world—holds no appeal for these men.

The theoretical implications of China's authoritarian resilience are complex. For the last half-century, scholars have debated whether totalitarian regimes can adapt to modernity. The implications of the Chinese case for this discussion are two: First, in order to adapt and survive, the regime has had to do many of the things predicted by Talcott Parsons and those who elaborated his theory: The regime has had to 1) abandon utopian ideology and charismatic styles of leadership; 2) empower a technocratic elite; 3) introduce bureaucratic regularization, complexity, and specialization; and 4) reduce control over private speech and action. Second, contrary to the Parsonian prediction, these adaptations have not led to regime change. In Richard Lowenthal's terms, the regime has moved "from utopia to development."¹⁷ But the Party has been able to do all these things without triggering a transition to democracy.

Although such a transition might still lie somewhere in the future, the experience of the past two decades suggests that it is not inevitable. Under conditions that elsewhere have led to democratic transition, China has made a transition instead from totalitarianism to a classic authoritarian regime, and one that appears increasingly stable.

Of course, neither society-centered nor actor-centered theories of democratic transition predict any particular outcome to be inevitable in any particular time frame. The Chinese case may, accordingly, merely reinforce the lesson that the outcome depends on politicians and their will to power. Alternatively, it may end up reminding us that democratic transition can take a long time. But it may also suggest a more disturbing possibility: that authoritarianism is a viable regime form even under conditions of advanced modernization and integration with the global economy.

NOTES

1. As an example, see the multi-author symposium on Chinese democracy in *Journal of Democracy* 9 (January 1998).

2. In other words, to adapt a concept from democratic consolidation theory, the CCP has once again made itself the only game in town and is in the process of carrying out a successful transfer of power.

3. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 12–24.

4. The factual base for this discussion is contained in Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, *China's New Rulers: The Secret Files* (New York: New York Review Books,

2002), and is summarized in two articles in the *New York Review of Books*, 26 September and 10 October 2002. These publications are in turn based on Zong Hairen, *Disidai* (The Fourth Generation) (Carle Place, N.Y.: Mirror Books, 2002). Zong Hairen's account of the new generation of Chinese leaders is based on material contained in internal investigation reports on candidates for the new Politburo compiled by the Chinese Communist Party's Organization Department.

5. *The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People—In Their Own Words*, Zhang Liang, comp., Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, eds. (New York: PublicAffairs Books, 2001), 102, n. 1, and *passim*.

6. Zong Hairen, *Zhu Rongji zai 1999* (Zhu Rongji in 1999) (Carle Place, N.Y.: Mingjing Chubanshe, 2001); English translation edited by Andrew J. Nathan in *Chinese Law and Government* (January–February and March–April 2002).

7. Like any meritocratic process, of course, this one had elements of contingency. Hu Jintao's career is a good example, in particular his 1992 selection from among four candidates as the representative of the Fourth Generation to join the PBSC.

8. Michael Dowdle, "The Constitutional Development and Operations of the National People's Congress," *Columbia Journal of Asian Law* 12 (Spring 1997): 1–125.

9. *Disidai*, ch. 11.

10. *Disidai*, ch. 1.

11. The 1993 survey was conducted for the project on "Political Culture and Political Participation in Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong." The 2002 survey was conducted for the project on "East Asia Barometer: Comparative Survey of Democratization and Value Changes." Data courtesy of Tianjian Shi.

12. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 173, n. 2. Also Tianjian Shi, "Cultural Impacts on Political Trust: A Comparison of Mainland China and Taiwan," *Comparative Politics* 33 (July 2001): 401–19.

13. On components of legitimacy, see M. Stephen Weatherford, "Measuring Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 86 (March 1992): 149–66. The relationship I am proposing between successful coercion and legitimacy is hypothetical; so far as I know it has not been empirically established.

14. Tianjian Shi, *Political Participation in Beijing* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); Melanie Manion, "The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside," *American Political Science Review* 90 (December 1996): 736–48.

15. Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China," *China Quarterly* (December 1997): 832–62, and personal communication. On legal aid, see *Disidai*, ch. 7; the province is Guangdong.

16. See Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, *New Rulers*, chs. 7, 8.

17. Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (New York: Free Press, 1951), 525–35; Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), 33–116.